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ASYMMETRICAL REGIONAL INTEGRATION:
COMPARING THE MOTIVES AND INFLUENCE OF
SMALL AND LARGE STATES
Why do states with different capabilities and interests engage in regional integration?
Neoliberals increasingly challenge the assumptions of the realist paradigm as they contend that
an increased sensitivity to other states characterizes inteQ1ational relations and_ this ac~ounts for ·
the proliferation of regional cooperative agreements between states. While not assuming perfect
symmetry or mutual vulnerability, neoliberals argue that the sensitivity of states to the actions of
others has altered traditional conceptions of power, hegemony, and dependence in world politics.
A new era of transnational interdependence is antiquating the realist notion of indissoluble state
_sovereignty. One of the most important areas of study for neoliberals is .regional economic
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integration. While not asserting that all states enter regional integration pacts for .similar reasons,
-

.

neoliberals emphasizefunctionalism as a global process that presumably affects all.states
similarly. However, not all states are of equal power and importance in regional economic
organizations s~ch as the European Union (EU) or the member states of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This article explores the motives and influence of two states, 911e
large and one small, involved in. regional integration. My
thesis
is that an .inverse
relationship
,
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exists between the incentive
of
market access emphasized by neoliberals
and the ·perceived power
.
.
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a state has within the organization. For small states, such as Ireland, access to the ·large market
entices membership. Large states, such as the United States, may not gain access to a mm;h
larger market than their own, but they assUIIJ.e they have power and influence within the
- organization which justifies membership. _From these two cases I conclude that not only is
symmetry or mutual vulnerability not necessary to achieve regional integration, but that different
states engage in regional integration for different reasons;_ I advo.cate a more refined and limited
functionalist exploration for membership and participation in regional International
Governmental Organizations (IGOs). This approach to regional integration distinguishes large

successful in terms of fulfilling common interests between states. The most important interest
these organizations have served for .states is to advance their economic well-being and yield
greater levels of prosperity. Participation in international organizations has clearly benefited
states in economic terms, 6 and this reality provides further incentive for states to cooperate across
national boundaries for their continued economic benefit. Contemporary functionalist theories,
such as Corbey's theory of dialectical functionalism, no longer assume an incessant and
inexorable process of integration. Instead, integration occurs as an action-reaction process
among institutions, -member states, and domestic interest groups. From this perspective
problems, delays, and stagnation-in integration only serve to reinvigorate this process in the longterm.7
Keohane and Nye have led the neoliberal effort to adapt functionalist theory so that it is
relevant for the contemporary international system. 8 The increased flow of goods, services and
capital has had dramatic effects on states and even has altered the traditional domestic basis of
politics.9 The contemporary functionalist theories of neoliberals, sometimes called
neofunctionalism do not assume that regional integrati9n will result in international institutions
eroding the sovereignty of the state. However, some supporters of this approach advocate the
concept of "pooled sovereignty" which recognizes that states remain the dominant actor in
regional organizations but that the responsibility for the well-being of the international institution
is shared among the governments who form and belong to the organization. 10 In these
circumstances, th~ membership ofthe·state in the IGO clearly is seento place constraints on the
foreign policy choices of individual governments. However, this.conception ofneofunctionalism
and its effect on states' foreign policy, including their regional trade policy, neglects to
appreciate how policies that promote integration of markets are a result of domestic forces from
the inside.,.out as well as the outside-in. 11 Domestic politics plays an important role in
determining the logic of state behavior in regional IGOs, and this is too often ignored in
functionalist and neofunctionalist theories of integration.
3

Even if small states have the greater economic incentiv~ to seek regional integration, they
lack the power and capacity to compel their_ larger neighbors to join organizations or further
cooperation within existing institutions. Previous research indicates that large or powerful states
choose to commit to multilateral arrangements because they value the future highly and are
critical in the creation of regional IGOs because they possess a disproportional amount of
· power. 17 - The advantage of access to an expanded market, while not as colll.pelling for large states

as it is for small states, nevertheless provides an important long-term incentive for states to
continue cooperating in regional efforts of economic integration. Large states, by definition, ·
have more power and capabilities and one would expect more influence in these organizations.
However, Goldstein has demonstrated that the United States has surprisingly less power and
influence in dispute settlement procedures than.its North American neighbors. 18 In contrast, the
most powerful states in Europe and especially Germany were seen to have an asymmetrical
amount of influence in the process of bargaining in the most recent efforts of regional
integration. 19 It would seem to be the case that because large states have a disproportionat~
amount of influence in negotiating the treaty that brings integration they expect to have greater
influence within the.regional IGO .. This may or.may not be the case due to the structure of the
IGO and the domestic political factors that determine the level ofiriterest and effectiveness of
states within IGOs. Thus, while small states may achieve more potential economic benefit from
regional integration; they have less perceived influence .within the institution. Large states are
compensated for the reduced economic incentive that encourages economic integration with
perceived power in the organization.
_Although the reality of power and its pursuit cannot be ignored in international relations,
the reality of integration also needs to be appreciated. The international system may continue to
be described as one of anarchy, but this anarchy no longer prescribes a world of chaos and
disorder. As Alexander Wendt has noted, "Anarchy is What States Make ofit."20 What states
make of their situation in this world ofanarchy is determined by their experience in relating to
others in the international system, their conception of self-identity, and a variety_ of other social
5

necessarily meant an end to econorp.ic protectionism and a strategy of autarky. 24 The Irish
government's decision to promote economic growth was predicated on the assumption that the
state could play an impqrtant and positive role in achieving national economic objectives. The
basic strategy of the state was to channel and direct investment into enterprises that had good
export potential. The Irish Development Authority (IDA) was the specific governmental body
directed to attract appropriate direct foreign investment and promote Irish exports abroad. These .
policies proved to be successful in achieving economic growth as the Irish economy boomed in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. As part of its plan for export-oriented ~owth Ireland sought to
reintegrate its economy with that of the international capitalist system. It did so. first with the
creation of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area in 1966 and later when it joined the European
Economic Co~unity (EEC) in 1973.25 By the time Ireland gained admittance into the·EEC, the
Irish mass public was solidly behind this proposal as an overwhelming eighty-three percent
favor~d this measure. 26 The Irish perceived their membership in the EEC as not confli~ting with
their historic policy of neutrality. The Irish policy of neutrality had always been one of asserting
~dependence and a separate national identity,·not one merely interested in the avoidance of
international involvement. 27
Gaining access to new markets for their agricultural surplus served as the primary
incentive for Irish support of European integration.28 Sheehy claims that Irish farmers were
especially supportive of the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).29
Access to larger markets in Western Europe also serve as an incentive for some Irish industries.
In addition, the Irish realized that if Britain joined the Common Market and Ireland failed to do
so they would be excluded from trade with their largest trading partner. 3° Finally, by joining the
EEC Ireland would be able to widen its economic relationships with others in Europe. This
would enable it to minimize its historic~ dependence on GreatBritain for trade. 31 As a result of
its greater integration with other European economies, the Irish economy has become less
·dependent on foreign investment l;llld trade with Great Britain.32
[Figure 1 Here]
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Figure 2
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aftermath of this treaty. 33 The government repeated statistics that indicated that Ireland receives
six times as much from the European Community than it contributes. While future investment
and jobs were of critical importance, so was the continuation of £940 million in annual EC
supports to Irish agriculture. Maastricht also.promised to benefit'lrelaild in terms of its ability to
improve public services.34 As the Taoiseach (Irish for Prime Minister), Albert Reynolds, stated
while campaigning for the referendum in Roscommon,
There was no point in pretending that material factors are relatively
unimportant or that we are about that sort of thin. Ireland's
interests and the European ideal both point in the same direction35

· While relentlessly stressing the economic benefits of a "yes" vote and the dire
·consequences of a "no" vote, Reynolds and other advocates of the treaty also sought to reassure
those who questioned the impact ofMaastricht oh Ireland's unique cultural heritage .. Reynolds
promised that any future effort to involve Ireland in a military alliance would require a national
referendum. In addition, he pledged that his government would pursue a peace policy. that would
insure Ireland's historic neutrality policy. Reynolds was also able to insert a special provision in
the Treaty itself that protected Ireland from any EC attempt to interfere with its abortion law.··
Finally, the government promised a referendum in the Fall that would settle the issue of travel ·
and information regarding abortion. All of these efforts were intended to remove the fears of
voters anxious about the Maastricht's potential implications for Ireland's culturally defined.
traditions.
While most of the political establishment in Ireland publicly·supported the treaty and
campaigned for its ratification, many questioned the merits of the treaty given its likely effects on
two critical issues: aborti.on and neutrality.· An Irish Times/MRBI poll taken just a week before
the referendum found that of those opposed to the referendum 29% cited the ·treaty's affect on·
abortion law and 18% interpreted it as a loss of neutrality as the bases for their opposition to the
treaty. Thus, those seeking to secure Ireland's unique cultural heritage opposed the referendum
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has meant that the Irish could find ~ sense of identity for themselves and interact with the rest of
.
.
.
.
the·world in a way that would not mean a return to historic and cultural.dependence on Britain.
Although Sharp presents Ireland as a weak dependent state in the context of the European
Community, he admits that Ireland's good citizen role has provided a status to the Irish that
allows them to believe they are more sovereign and independent than they really are. 37 European·
integration meant more than just new markets for the Irish. It meant that Ireland could integrate
with others in a setting based on sovereign equality that would not sacrifice its hard won
independence. The social and cultural consequences of European integration have not, however,
.fulfilled the dreams of the Gaelic revival or the aspirations expressed by Eamon de Valera in an
earlier era. The effect of integration has seriously challenged Ireland's traditional national selfidentity and natiornilistic policies,38 but this reality should not be seen as the intended
consequence or the popular perception of Irish membership.in-the European Union.·-As the
former Taoiseach, Charles Haughey has said:
· I feel sure that membership in the Community will make us [the Irish] all the
more conscious of our national identity and appreciative or our:distinct cultural
--values and· willstimulate us to greater efforts to preserve them. 39
For the Irish, the economic benefits that have come via membership in the Europe~ Union
outweigh whatever costs are associated with the potential loss of a distinctive national culture.

The United States and NAFTA

. Recent examinations of American trade policy portray US policy as taking a dramatically
different course in the post-Cold War period. Global free traders denounce increasing bilateral
··and protectionist tendencies in American trade policy.40 Others identify a pattern of an
increasingly inward-looking policy as a result of domestic needs and priorities replacing global
security interests as a basis for Americanforeign economic policy. 41 These oyerviews of changes
in American economic foreign policy minimize a new form of engagement the United States has·
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Figure 3
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Figure 4

US DIRECT ·FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN.:NAFTA COUNTRIES
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America's working class. Clearly, we are not close to achieving a United States of Europe or a
United States of North America, but patterns of economic cooperation that have emerged have
important long-term cultural implications. While a·"European Man" or "North American woman" has yet to be created, there is evidence of an increasingly cosmopolitan sense of self that
exists-for the Irish in the European context and that exists among .Anlencans in the North
American context. 51 Rapid political unification remains elusive as ever -- not so. qmch be9ause of
differing economic interests but.because cultural differences provide fot different senses of
identity and these challenge contemporary efforts of regional integration. Despite these ·
limitations, we can expect regional integration to continue
as long as the domestic economic- and
.
.
cultural -interests of states are served and as lo~g as the most powerful states in a region support

it.
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